Linguistic Diversity in Kharkiv: Between "Pride" and "Profit," Between the Local and the Global

Ganna (Anna) Pletnyova
University of Calgary

Abstract: This paper explores the linguistic diversity of the city of Kharkiv, focusing on the language ideologies and practices of Russian-speaking Kharkivites in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian military conflict of 2014. This conflict polarized Ukrainian Russophones into competing ideological positions for or against Russia and gave fresh vigour to the long-existing linguistic debate in Ukraine, which was a result of the Russian government's manipulations of the Ukrainian language situation. The political convictions of Russian-speaking Kharkivites affect their linguistic behaviour, motivating them to attempt to switch to Ukrainian, to advocate bi- or multilingualism, or to demonstratively use only Russian.

A field study that I carried out in Kharkiv in the summer of 2018 examined correlations and discrepancies between Kharkivites' linguistic ideologies and their real-life language practices, focusing on the interaction between two factors: the discourse of "pride" in speaking a particular language, which is anchored in a speaker's interpretations of the role of language in a nation, and the discourse of "profit," which is based on a speaker's expectation of economic benefits related to mastering a certain language.

The study results reveal the vacillations of this Russian-speaking community between support for the monolingual ideology of the nation-state and the globalizing concept of multilingualism, demonstrating an interplay between discourses of "pride" and "profit" and the influence of local and global forces.

Keywords: linguistic ideologies, language maintenance and shift, pride and profit, local and global, Kharkiv, Ukraine.

1. Introduction

In 2014, dissatisfied with the victory of the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine, Russia capitalized on the long-existing linguistic debate and a possible repeal of the 2012 Ukrainian language legislation, adopted by the ousted pro-Russian Viktor Ianukovych government, to spark off pro-Russian separatism in Ukraine. The 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law "Pro zasady derzhavnoi movnoi polityky" ("On the Principles of State Language Policy") granted official status to regional and minority languages in the regions of Ukraine where such speakers constituted roughly ten percent of the population. In reality, the law de facto legalized the already dominant position of the Russian language in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine,

© 2020 *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956
Volume VII, No. 1 (2020) DOI: https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus570

saving the residents of these communities the trouble of learning, or ever using, Ukrainian, the country's official language. This law was regarded as unconstitutional by some language policy experts (Riabchuk). Russian propaganda used the announcement of the repeal of the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law by the new Ukrainian government in 2014 to start a conflict ostensibly "to defend the Russian-speaking compatriots" in Ukraine ("Putin poprosil"). This debate polarized Russian-speaking Ukrainians into those who fully supported Russia's discourse and those who rejected it in favour of a stronger Ukrainian identity. As the Russo-Ukrainian military conflict was initially prompted by a language issue, I consider it crucial to examine the influence of the political events described above on the language ideologies of Ukrainian citizens residing in a region close to the war zone.

Here, I present some of the results of a field study conducted in summer 2018 in Kharkiv, the second-biggest city in Ukraine by population, situated 30 kilometres from Russia ("Arkhiv. Chysel'nist' naselennia"). A border city with both Russian and Ukrainian historical narratives, Kharkiv has always been a site of competing forces. The city grew into an important administrative centre under the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, and in 1805 it welcomed the establishment of the first university in Russia-controlled Ukraine. Kharkiv university played an important role in Ukrainian national revival, and in his seminal work on nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson refers to it as "the centre for a boom in Ukrainian literature," which speaks to its cultural and social significance (74). Although predominantly Russian-speaking,[1] Kharkiv was the centre of Ukrainization under Lenin's policy of indigenization in the 1920s during its fifteen years as the capital of Soviet Ukraine (Pauly 12). However, it was purged of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism" a decade later, when a whole generation of Ukrainophone intelligentsia was forcibly suppressed and executed (Fouse 42; Martin 329-48, 401). In Soviet times, Kharkiv developed into a major industrial and scientific centre, where Russian functioned as the

[1] 65.86% of Kharkiv's population declared Russian to be their "native tongue" in the census of 2001 ("Vseukrains'kyi perepys naselennia '2001'"). However, as the census used the term "native tongue" ("*ridna mova*"), which was tied to ethnicity in the Soviet Union, it is considered to be ambiguous by some scholars, who point to a discrepancy between the declared "native tongue" of the population and their actual language usage (Kulyk, "Soviet Nationalities Policies" 203; Arel, "Recensement et légitimation" 29). Here, Kharkiv is called "Russian-speaking" because Russian is used by its residents in most social domains (Søvik, "Language Practices" 10-11, 21). However, this does not imply that Russian speakers use Russian one hundred percent of the time, as this research demonstrates. Russian speakers are often bilingual (Russian-Ukrainian) but they tend to use Russian in a significant number of contexts and situations.

© 2020 *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956

main language of communication, culture, and science. Ukrainian, on the other hand, was considered a lower rural language, despite being taught in secondary schools (Bilaniuk, *Contested Tongues* 79). In independent Ukraine, Kharkiv maintained close economic links to Russia, while at the same time boasting a booming Western-oriented information technology (IT) industry. The city has traditionally voted for pro-Russian political parties and has been largely indifferent to the two Ukrainian pro-Western movements, the Orange Revolution of 2004-05 and the Euromaidan of 2013-14. In 2014, Kharkiv was targeted by the Russian government as a potential pro-Russian separatist area, but, after Russia's attempt to bring an official separation failed, Kharkiv became a major centre of volunteers supporting the Ukrainian front, which was located just 300 kilometres away. With such a rich history of competing ideologies and opposing socio-political forces, Kharkiv offers a compelling site for the current research.

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it sought to gain a comprehensive picture of Russian-speaking Kharkivites' linguistic ideologies and attitudes toward Russian, Ukrainian, and foreign languages (especially languages of the European Union and English) in the wake of the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian military conflict. Second, it aimed to provide a better understanding of how the linguistic ideologies of participants in the study have influenced individual language practices, which, when cumulated over many individuals, ultimately contribute to language maintenance (the preservation of habitual language use) or language shift (gradual switch to another language) (Fishman 73). Two factors were taken into account in the analysis of the results—(1) differing interpretations of national identity (i.e., "pride") and (2) the economic interest behind language choice (i.e., "profit"), both of which correspond to the modernizing discourse of the nation-state and the globalizing discourse of the market economy.

2. Theoretical Framework

Combining the works of North American linguistic anthropologists (Woolard 9-27; Heller, *Paths to Post-Nationalism* 37, and "Bilingualism" 2-3) with those of European social psychologists (Moscovici 30-31; Jodelet 53; Bourdieu 42-45), I view linguistic ideologies as shared systems of perceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and beliefs about language and its uses, shaped by socio-political processes and power relations within a given community. Shifts in such systems are especially active in times of social and political changes in society. As the upsurge in feelings of national belonging among Russian-speaking Kharkivites is one of the factors shaping their language behaviours, I present definitions of the concepts of identity in general, and of national identity in particular, below.

In my interpretation of identity, I draw on Tajfel and Turner's social identity theory, which posits that an individual's personal identity is inseparable from his or her social identity. Social identity is made up of memberships in multiple social groups that are distinguished by religion, profession, ethnicity, language or nationality, and with which the individual sympathizes and shares emotional involvement to various degrees (Tajfel and Turner 15). The composition of social identity is dynamic and continually evolving: in times of crisis, for example, the most attacked part of it may become the most salient. This is precisely what happened in Ukraine in 2014, when national identity gained in importance for Ukrainians (Kulyk, "Language and Identity" 93).

To define national identity, I refer to Anthony D. Smith's interpretation of national identity as "a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of collective personality and distinctive culture" (17). Smith identifies two key dimensions of national identity—ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial (15). The former is based on a common ethnic origin, culture, traditions, and language, while the latter unites individuals who share political will and values, and may be fostered by political institutions that grant equal rights to all citizens. These two dimensions correspond to traditionalist and modernist interpretations of the notion of "nation." Language may be viewed as belonging to both dimensions: if language is considered to be an intrinsic component of belonging to the people, it contributes to the ethnic model, and if language is understood as an instrument that gives access to the democratic process, it can function as part of the civic model (Hjerm 340). In the ethnic or ethnocultural national model, a single language for all citizens is viewed as the only natural condition, while multilingualism is explained by artificial intrusion in the natural language situation. In the case of the civic model, ethnocultural diversity may be accepted and officially protected, but knowledge of the state language is deemed indispensable for citizens to be able to participate in a democratic society. Normally, civic-territorial national projects have frequently been pursued by nation-states formed by Western European aristocratic élites, whose objective was to "incorporate lower strata and outlying areas" (Smith 123). On the other hand, the ethnic-genealogical model was typical for Eastern European countries without their own territory; it was formed from below through mobilization of vernacular culture, language, and history (123). Emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent state, Ukraine opted for ethno-nationalist monolingualism (Pavlenko 42). The language of the titular ethnic group, Ukrainian, became the official language. However, due to Ukraine's aspiration to European integration, it is also impacted by the civic model of the European nation-states (Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 123). Albeit mostly monolingual, these states pledge to protect their regional and minority languages and the rights

of their speakers. These two views of the language situation—ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial—are reflected in the language ideologies of Ukrainians.

Another type of national identity that can represent a Russian-speaking Ukrainian goes beyond the nation and is termed by Smith as "pan-nationalism," or "pan-Slavism" in the case of Slavic countries, which he defines as "movements to unify in a single cultural and political community of several, usually contiguous, states on the basis of shared cultural characteristics or a 'family of cultures'" (171). This ideology often attracts Russian-speaking Ukrainians who react negatively to the new pro-Western orientation of Ukraine, seeing Ukraine's future in union with Russia.

However, the desire to express linguistic solidarity is not the only factor that influences people's linguistic practices. There are always pragmatic considerations—what is the benefit of learning a new language or changing language practices? In this regard, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduces the notion of language as "symbolic capital," which implies that language practices can yield material benefits (68-83). As such, the promise of economic gain might motivate individuals to attempt a shift in their linguistic behaviour. According to John Edwards, this shift often reflects pragmatic desires for social mobility and an improved standard of living, desires that are reinforced in times of political instability (50).

Likewise, Monica Heller and Alexandre Duchêne term the nationalistic and economic factors influencing individual language practices as "pride and profit": they refer to the "pride" of speaking a language as a national or regional identity marker and the "profit" of exchanging a language for material values (6-7). In the new economy of global economic co-operation and market expansion, the communication is central to the exchange of goods, and language is a source of material gain (Heller, *Paths to Post-Nationalism* 20). The discourse of pride and the discourse of profit are intertwined: pride brings the community together through a single local language, and the use of more profitable international languages (English, French, Spanish) can open doors to bigger labour markets. Although Ukrainian, not Russian, is the official language of Ukraine, the latter retains its market advantage. In Soviet times, Russian was the language of culture, science, industry, and inter-republican communication, and it is still spoken in a number of post-Soviet countries (Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 124). On the other hand, despite being the only state language of Ukraine, Ukrainian is yet to get on its feet in terms of linguistic market value and prestige after years of Russification and the dominance of Russian in big urban centres in the east and south of Ukraine. These competing factors were taken into consideration when analyzing the linguistic ideologies of the study participants.

3. Literature Review

Reporting on the findings from a field study in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine in the mid-1990s, David D. Laitin introduced the term “Russian-speaking population” to categorize Russian speakers in post-Soviet countries other than Russia. These speakers may have had different ethnic origins, but they shared the same common characteristic—the Russian language (Laitin 31). In his analysis of this group’s identity development and the possibility of their assimilation into the titular nation, Laitin predicted two scenarios for Ukraine. First, if the country pursued an ethnocultural national project, stressing the importance of a single language, he deemed it possible for Ukraine to become a Ukrainian-dominant zone, as, due to the proximity of Russian and Ukrainian languages, the learning of Ukrainian for Russian speakers is quite feasible (Laitin 360). Second, if Ukraine attempted a civic national program, in which diversity is officially recognized, the Ukrainian government would have to address the language rights of the Russian-speaking majority in the east and the south. This might lead to their cultural autonomy, meaning that they would have mobility inside their regions, where they remained Russian-speaking monolinguals, but, for mobility within the whole country, they would need to learn the titular Ukrainian language (Laitin 361). Although Ukraine has been an officially monolingual state since 1991, neither of these scenarios has been put into practice due to the inconsistent language policies of changing Ukrainian governments and the pressure to implement civic European documents, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which Ukraine ratified as a country striving for European integration (“European Convention”; “European Charter”; “Framework Convention”).

Despite this lack of consistency, there have been two waves of state language promotion after two pro-Western movements in 2004 and 2014. Both state language promotions motivated political and sociolinguistic research on Ukrainian language attitudes and practices; the most important studies for the current project are described below.

Between 2003 and 2005, at the time of the first pro-Western Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Margrethe B. Søvik carried out a study in Kharkiv and published it as a book titled *Support, Resistance and Pragmatism: An Examination of Motivation in Language Policy in Kharkiv, Ukraine*. In her work, Søvik found that the Ukrainian east is not as homogeneous as it is simplistically portrayed, and there is great variation in people’s attitudes toward language and politics. Furthermore, this variation needs to be taken into consideration when researching the language situation at a time of societal changes (Søvik, *Support* 296-97). As such, I aimed to capture the

breadth and diversity of views and perceptions in the current study by drawing on population samples from ideologically differing groups, which I determined on the basis of the all-Ukrainian studies discussed below.

Volodymyr Kulyk distinguishes three competing ideologies—Ukrainophone, Russophone, and centrist—among different Ukrainian political and intellectual groups, each of which claims to represent the interests of corresponding language groups among the Ukrainian population ("What Is Russian" 124). First, the Ukrainophone point of view corresponds to the discourse of the monolingual nation-state, which supports the wider use of Ukrainian and views Russian as the language of the former empire and a tool that could still be used as a cultural weapon against Ukrainian statehood (Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 125). Second, the Russophone discourse defends the language rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, demanding equal status for Russian alongside Ukrainian and arguing that, advantageously, Russian serves as a means of communication with Russia and many other post-Soviet countries (Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 125). Finally, the centrists defend the interests of the entire population of Ukraine, accepting Ukrainian as the only national language, symbolic of the whole Ukraine, but advocating the official acceptance of Russian as the language of one part of its population (Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 126). Oleksandr Maiboroda and Mai Panchuk also discuss population groups of opposing linguistic ideologies, distinguishing (1) "nation-state people," who think that language is the soul and cement of the nation; (2) proponents of the official status of Russian, who consider the first group to be a threat to themselves; and (3) centrists, who support Ukrainization but consider bilingualism to be an asset (205-06).

In a similar vein, after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014, the American linguistic anthropologist Laada Bilaniuk identified two opposing tendencies in language ideology and practice, which she called "Language does not matter" (referring to those who defend their right to use whichever language they like and support state multilingualism) and "Language matters" (referring to those who stress the importance of Ukrainian for national unification). These concepts are based, once again, on civic and ethnocultural interpretations of nationalism (Bilaniuk, "Ideologies of Language" 139). Bilaniuk also points to the need to investigate the trend of "self-Ukrainization" in the case of the latter ideology, which is one of the key objectives of the research presented here ("Ideologies of Language" 146).

What Bilaniuk fails to mention is the radical tendency developed among some of Kulyk's ideological "Russophones" ("What Is Russian" 125), particularly those in the east and south of the country, in response to the Euromaidan Revolution, which they rejected as being anti-Russian and instigated by NATO. Spurning the new pro-Western post-Maidan Ukraine,

this ideological group[2] started to identify more with Russia than with Ukraine, going as far as refusing to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. This attitude had an impact on their language use.

Taking the research mentioned above into account, for the current study I sought participants representative of three ideological groups: (1) pro-Ukrainian "Language does not matter," (2) pro-Ukrainian "Language matters," and (3) pro-Russian. A more detailed description of the three groups will be presented in the methodology section of this paper.

Kulyk and Bilaniuk interpret the influence of conflict on the language behaviour of Ukrainians differently. According to Kulyk, stronger identification with the Ukrainian nation and positive attitudes toward the Ukrainian language did not induce Russian-speaking Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian or even to add it to their communicative repertoire ("Language" 103). Bilaniuk posits that Russia's actions in Ukraine persuaded many people to learn Ukrainian or to use it more often, mentioning Kharkivites as an example ("Ideologies of Language" 145). I believe that linguistic change cannot happen overnight; it is a time-consuming, gradual process. Therefore, it is particularly important to examine the language attitudes and practices of Russophones several years after the beginning of the 2014 conflict.

4. Methodology

The empirical basis for this research project was provided by a field study conducted in Kharkiv in the summer of 2018, when I interviewed 32 Russian-speaking city residents (16 male and 16 female). The study was anonymous, but age, profession, and level of education were three categories retained for the analysis of factors behind language choice. Ethnicity was not considered a pertinent variable influencing the participants' choice of code because previous studies (Laitin 190; Arel, "La Face cachée" 26; Kulyk, "Language and Identity in Ukraine" 94) have shown that regional identity is much more influential than ethnicity for eastern Ukrainians, especially those in the younger generation who have no memory of Soviet practices of dividing the population according to ethnic origin and linking ethnic origin to an individual's "native language." This premise was confirmed in the current study.

---

[2] According to Kulyk's research, this group is not as numerous as the other two groups ("Language" 95).

4.1 Research Questions

The current study was guided by the following three research questions:

1. Have there been any changes in language attitudes among Kharkivites in the wake of the conflict with Russia, and have they resulted in any changes in language behaviour (e.g., "self-Ukrainization")?
2. If there have been changes in linguistic behaviour under the influence of language attitudes and ideologies, in which domains of linguistic behaviour are they taking place and how (Fishman 74-75)?
3. How do discourses of "pride" and "profit" influence the processes of language maintenance and language shift (Heller and Duchêne 6-7)?

4.2 Ideological Groups

In an attempt to glean a wide range of opinions and perspectives, I sought participants who spoke Russian as a native language from three different ideological groups (pro-Ukrainian "Language matters" and "Language does not matter"; and pro-Russian), which I determined based both on previous research (Bilaniuk, "Ideologies of Language" 139; Maiboroda and Panchuk 205-06; Kulyk, "What Is Russian" 124) and my own informal observations of people's behaviours, social networks, and personal communications.

As the main point of polarization among Kharkivites in 2014 was the political choice for or against Russia, I conditionally divided the study participants into two groups—pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian. Pro-Ukrainian individuals normally have a strong Ukrainian national identity but differ on the interpretation of nationalism; for some nationalism is ethnocultural and for some it is civic. The first subgroup of pro-Ukrainian participants, a group that Bilaniuk labels "Language matters," adheres to the ethnocultural type of nationalism, embraces the Ukrainian-only policy, and attaches importance to language for state consolidation. This subgroup is likely to attempt a switch to Ukrainian or to increase its usage in their everyday linguistic practices. The second pro-Ukrainian subgroup consists of those for whom nationalism is civic. This subgroup, which Bilaniuk labels as "Language does not matter," shares the Ukrainophile zeal of the first subgroup but considers the nation to be united by political will rather than language. The "Language does not matter" subgroup ranges in opinion from the acceptance of Ukrainian as the country's only official language (defending, at the same time, the use of any language in personal communication) to the support of regional and even state official

bilingualism, which brings them closer to the pro-Russian cohort. The pro-Russian group prioritizes the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and advocates for the recognition of Russian as the second official language of Ukraine. In the most radical of cases, pro-Russian individuals refuse to identify themselves as Ukrainians, dismissing the Ukrainian language as a dialect of Russian and considering eastern Ukraine to be part of Russia. Often, they blame the West, and especially the USA, for the Maidan Revolution of 2013-14, and see the political future of Ukraine to be in union with Russia rather than with Europe—an opinion that also adheres to the pan-Slavic idea and further influences their language attitudes and practices.

Although I draw on three separate ideological groups to categorize the participants, I am well aware that, in practice, these ideologies are a continuum of opinions rather than clear-cut distinct entities.

4.3 Recruitment of Participants

Snowball sampling was the main method of participant recruitment. Being a cultural insider, born and raised in Kharkiv, I began by contacting several acquaintances from my social entourage, suggesting that they participate in the research. Knowing beforehand which opinions they held, I reached out to people with different points of view. After the interview, I asked them if they knew anyone else who would be willing to participate in the study. The goal of this method was to ensure that participants trusted the researcher and identified the researcher as one of them.

Relying on qualitative research methods, I conducted semi-structured interviews and retained relevant statistical data, such as the number of participants who demonstrated observable phenomena across the investigated groups. As I roughly divided my population sample into three ideological groups, my aim was to interview thirty participants overall (i.e., ten participants per group). I deemed ten participants per group a sufficiently representative sample because, as stated by Trainor, it provides enough data for a qualitative study to be thoroughly analyzed without becoming overwhelming (127). Eventually, thirty-two people in total agreed to participate, an equal number of women and men, aged between 18 and 67. Twenty-seven participants had a higher education degree and five participants had a high school diploma.

4.4 Interviews and Procedure

Semi-structured interviews were selected as the main instrument of data collection as they enable the researcher to ask broad open-ended questions and to obtain varied in-depth answers, which questionnaires cannot provide. The interviews lasted from thirty to fifty minutes and were conducted one-on-one in order to put the participant at ease and eliminate any effect that might result from having other people present.

Participants were given a choice of language in consent forms (Russian, Ukrainian, English) and in interviews (Russian, Ukrainian). English was not offered as an option for the interviews because few participants had mastered it well enough to speak it freely and at length on topics connected to Ukrainian realities. I translated all excerpts from the interviews included in this article from Russian and Ukrainian into English.

In this paper, I present participants' responses to questions on (1) their linguistic competences and practices, including those in languages other than Russian and Ukrainian (the Maidan Revolution was a pro-European movement, so data on European languages are also important); (2) attitudes to Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages, and to recent changes regarding these languages.

To explore the participants' language practices, I used sources of variance at the heart of the language use proposed by Fishman (71-79) and Grosjean (34-35), which can be summarized as media or language skills (writing, reading, speaking), role relations between speakers, situations (formal, informal, intimate), and domains of linguistic behaviour (topics of conversation, locales of communication, socio-cultural patterns, etc.).

5. Results and Discussion

5.1 Statistical Data on Language Skills and General Language Behaviour

Nineteen participants chose consent forms written in Russian, eleven participants opted for consent forms written in Ukrainian, and two participants selected consent forms written in English. Most participants said they were comfortable reading and completing forms written in either the Russian or the Ukrainian language, but two thirds of the participants chose forms written in Russian, thus identifying Russian as their preferred language. The one third of the participants that opted for consent forms written in the Ukrainian language explained their choice (i) by saying that it was a matter of principle because they supported Ukrainian as the language

© 2020 *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956

of official documentation or (ii) by saying their choice was a result of a habit of reading official documents in Ukrainian. The two participants who selected consent forms written in English specified their English reading competence and their preference for reading the original copy.

Statistical data for the chosen interview language were similar to those of the consent forms. Twenty-two participants chose to speak Russian, six participants spoke Ukrainian, and four participants code-switched between Russian and Ukrainian, but spoke Ukrainian for a significant portion of the interview. In total, ten participants used Ukrainian in the interviews (speaking exclusively Ukrainian or code-switching between Russian and Ukrainian), which represents one third of the sample and corresponds to one of the three ideological groups (pro-Ukrainian "Language matters"). This is a notable change since Søvik's study, in which all interviews were in Russian with only single utterances in Ukrainian ("Language Practices" 10).

Two of the six participants who had chosen Ukrainian as the interview language spoke it with difficulty. Although they would have been more fluent in Russian, their desire to project a strong ethnocultural Ukrainian identity corresponding to their political beliefs compelled them to use the Ukrainian language. Therefore, the linguistic behaviour of the participants in these interviews did not necessarily correspond to their real-life practices.

Out of the six participants who spoke Ukrainian exclusively during the interview, only two had made a complete switch to the Ukrainian language in all areas of everyday life. Both participants were male, a 21-year-old barista and a 41-year-old IT specialist who were both connected with the Donbas pro-Russian separatist area and who supported Ukraine during the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian military conflict. Both of these participants explained that they had switched from Russian to Ukrainian "because of love for their motherland, not hatred for Russia," stressing that they wanted to "close the Ukrainian language question" (where several languages are competing on Ukraine's territory), and to speak in their "native tongue," Ukrainian. This position is fully consistent with the ethnocultural interpretation of national identity, where titular language is viewed as the only "natural" language for a citizen to speak. Given the age of the first participant (the 21-year-old barista), I would assume that, in addition to strong patriotic feelings for Ukraine, his choice of language is conditioned by the trend among pro-Ukrainian young people to speak more Ukrainian in daily life. In the case of the 41-year-old IT specialist, it is also likely that his professional affiliation plays a role in his use of Ukrainian. As most of the IT industry is pro-Western, with the majority of clients and managers based in North America and Europe, and given Ukraine's aspirations for European integration, the Ukrainian language is viewed as part of this pro-European orientation.

Eight of the participants who code-switched during the interview had made a partial switch to Ukrainian, which suggests that although they were

trying to use Ukrainian as much as possible, especially in writing and reading, a full switch to Ukrainian in oral speech required too much effort or was considered unnecessary. This was particularly the case with liberally-minded participants who indicated that they believed the state can demand the knowledge of the official language from its citizens but cannot impose it as the language of personal communication. Participants expressed that they chose to speak Ukrainian to state officials, people in the service industry, including waiters and salespeople, or at work (e.g., to teach or write official documentation), but continued to use Russian when communicating with friends and family. To illustrate, one such participant chose Russian as the language of the interview, but, when a waitress approached our table and greeted us in Russian, he demonstratively ordered his meal in Ukrainian, after which he turned to me and continued speaking in Russian. When asked why he did that, he replied that he preferred using Ukrainian "with people who are on duty." Among other participants who held this ideology, respondents with a more centrist position tended to choose Russian for the interview but reported that they used Ukrainian when addressed in it or to accommodate Ukrainian speakers.

The pro-Russian participants demonstrated the most consistency between the attitudes they expressed and the language they used: they chose Russian consent forms and communicated in Russian during the interviews. Four participants said that, out of principle, they avoided using Ukrainian in their daily lives as much as possible.

Although the participants were fairly evenly distributed within ideological groups, it is important to consider how they use language for different language skills, as this is an important factor contributing to the understanding of their choice of language use. The table below summarizes the participants' self-reported language usage in four main linguistic skills: reading, writing, oral communication, and listening comprehension.

Table 1: Summary of self-reported language usage in four main linguistic skills.

Linguistic Skills	Language matters	Language does not matter	Pro-Russian
Reading (for pleasure or work)	**Ukrainian and English**, sometimes Polish, German, or any other foreign language**, rarely Russian**	**Both Russian and Ukrainian**, sometimes a foreign language in which they have competence	**Mostly Russian, rarely Ukrainian** ("when forced to"), sometimes English or any other foreign language
Writing	**Ukrainian or English, rarely Russian**, especially in official documentation, in formal contexts, on social networks	**Mostly Russian and sometimes Ukrainian** (esp. in formal contexts, sometimes on social networks), any foreign language they master well enough. Reply in the language of the sender	**Mostly Russian, rarely Ukrainian** (when they have to in official contexts), sometimes any foreign language they master (especially at work or when travelling)
Oral Communication	**Most use Russian but try to switch to Ukrainian**, especially in official contexts and to accommodate speakers of Ukrainian; effort is made to speak more English or another foreign language	**Mostly Russian but may use Ukrainian when replying to a Ukrainian-speaking interlocutor**; any foreign language they have mastered well enough	**Mostly Russian, sometimes English** or any other foreign language, **never Ukrainian**

Table 1 continues.

Linguistic Skills	Language matters	Language does not matter	Pro-Russian
Listening comprehension (especially when watching films, TV, listening to radio)	**Prefer Ukrainian or English** (try to improve their understanding of the language); **sometimes Russian**	**Do not notice if it is Russian or Ukrainian**, trying to watch films in foreign languages	Understand Ukrainian well but **prefer Russian**

In Table 1, it appears that the pro-Ukrainian group has started to use more Ukrainian but there is a discrepancy between writing, reading, and speaking; speaking is the most difficult to master for adult participants because it demands on-the-spot decision making when choosing vocabulary and building sentences. Participants also reported accommodating Ukrainian speakers to show respect for them, to make a political statement, or to practice the language with native speakers. These actions were not previously common for Russian-speaking city-dwellers in the east, who used to expect Ukrainophones to switch to the Russian language (Søvik, "Language Practices" 21). Other circumstances in which Ukrainian is more often used orally include official situations (with government officials or when teaching) and communication with people in the service sector, which is motivated by the patriotic drive to promote the use of the state language by businesses. Participants who were university professors reported teaching in Ukrainian more often and not giving their students a choice of language—Russian or Ukrainian—as they had done in the past. It is also worth noting that participants who switched to Ukrainian either partially or completely also have a competence in English or another foreign language with which they can replace Russian, allowing them to access wider cultural and information resources. The pro-Russian cohort, on the other hand, was still willing to master English and EU languages despite their aversion to NATO. Finally, all participants were equally proficient in listening comprehension in both languages, which can be explained by the high exposure to Ukrainian through mass media. However, the pro-Russian participants still preferred Russian to Ukrainian.

5.2 Discourses of "Pride" and "Profit" in Participants' Language Attitudes and Practices

The participants' responses indicate a huge polarization in attitudes toward Russian and Ukrainian languages between the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, ranging from very negative views of Russian and positive views of Ukrainian to contempt toward Ukrainian and praise of Russian. Notably, the main similarity between participants of opposing ideological groups was their willingness to speak more than one language. The analysis of interview excerpts below demonstrates how local nationalistic discourses of "pride" and globalizing discourses of "profit" intertwine in participants' language ideologies and behaviours.

The pro-Ukrainian group ("Language matters") asserted that their attitude to Russian has changed for the worse since 2014. They reported that they did not view the Russian language as part of the Ukrainian national identity, even though they are unable to stop using it in everyday communication. For instance, Respondent 1, who speaks only Russian, displayed very negative feelings toward the Russian language and noted the beauty of the Ukrainian language, thus articulating his belonging to the Ukrainian nation, for which the Ukrainian language is symbolic.

> Interviewer: Which languages do you know, including foreign languages?
>
> Respondent 1: Only Russian, if we are talking about foreign languages. I speak Ukrainian with difficulty, but I understand absolutely everything, and consider it to be the most beautiful language, but I speak Russian, it's easier for me.
>
> Interviewer: However, you consider it to be a foreign language?
>
> Respondent 1: As a result of recent events, yes.
>
> Interviewer: Even though you speak it as your first language?
>
> Respondent 1: Despite it. Over the last four years, although I have lots of relatives in Russia, half of them with horrible behaviour towards us, it's difficult for me, as for many people here, to accept it. Russia is now alien to me, its language too, everything (43 years old, male, product quality inspector at bakery, interview in Russian).

Respondent 1 also reported that he is happy his son goes to a Ukrainophone school and is proud of the boy's Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism, as well as his progress in English. Later in the conversation, he mentioned that he would not want to lose his Russian, despite it being "an

alien language" because, that way, Ukrainians would become "one language poorer." His use of the word "poorer" when talking about language implies that he has connected his language practices with material values and that he views multilingualism as "wealth" or linguistic capital, which can potentially be used, alongside English, on the global linguistic market.

Likewise, Respondent 2 from the pro-Ukrainian group also considered Russian to be worthy of study, not as a home language, but as "the language of those who are against you," highlighting her opposition to Russia. She wants her child, however, to be educated in the Ukrainian language, which she sees as European.

> Respondent 2: My daughter goes to school, where they are studying Russian, Ukrainian and English. At first, I protested against Russian, but then I thought, on the other hand, it's also knowledge. The more you know, the better. You should understand the language of those who are against you. Forewarned is forearmed. However, I would like my child to be oriented toward the Ukrainian language, toward the pro-European world, open, not Russian, where there has never been anything good and never will be (37 years old, female, quality assurance engineer in IT, interview in Ukrainian).

Later during the interview, Respondent 2 mentioned that English is "number two in importance for her after Ukrainian." Thus, we can see that the discourse of nationalistic pride is blended with Respondent 2's understanding of the profit of knowing transnational languages (English, Russian). She explains her interest and "profit" in keeping Russian in her linguistic repertoire by the advantage of knowing "the language of the enemy," whereas English represents for her integration into the Western world and the promise of greater social opportunities.

The pro-Ukrainian group "Language does not matter" respected not only knowledge of the state language as a trait of "Europeanness" but also embraced the linguistic diversity of Ukraine, holding positive attitudes toward all languages and aspiring to personal multilingualism. Respondent 3 expressed this attitude in the excerpt below.

> Respondent 3: I find monolingualism archaic. I would like Ukraine to be a multicultural country. I haven't been to Switzerland, but I think it's a great example. They speak French, German, the part close to Italy—Italian. Also, they don't have a problem with English (29 years old, male, graphic designer, interview in Russian, also speaks good Ukrainian, some English and French).

Respondent 3 used the word "archaic," suggesting that he would like to go beyond Ukraine's state monolingualism and be more up to date with global world trends in which the knowledge of several languages can be beneficial

and profitable. That said, he later suggested that it was shameful to be unable to understand and use the state language of Ukraine. This demonstrates his national membership and directly refers to the civic understanding of the nation-state, exemplified by European democracies. As such, Western Europe represents for him both an ideal national project within Ukrainian governance and a wider global drive for mobility.

Respondent 4 shows that, rather than just using the Ukrainian language as an emblem of belonging to the Ukrainian nation, the "Language does not matter" subgroup puts forward another strategy of distancing themselves from Russia: they demand legitimization for their own variety of Russian as distinct from the Russian of Russia.

> Respondent 4: I have a very positive attitude to the Russian language because we shouldn't turn this situation upside down but use it to our own advantage. If Russia imposed its language on us historically and many people speak Russian here, it's absolutely normal. Two languages are better than one. We should just somehow officially recognize the Russian language of Ukrainians as different from that of Russian of Russians, like there's British English, American English, the English of Samoa. Because Ukrainians speak Russian differently—quieter, using more diminutive suffixes (29-30 years old, male, business analyst, interview in Ukrainian).

In this case, Respondent 4 associates his local pride and feelings of belonging to the nation with speaking the same language as Russia, but notes that it is spoken "differently" in Ukraine, and therefore should be considered a formally distinct variant that indicates membership in a separate national group. In other words, the participant believes Ukraine should continue to use Russian, but needs to legalize a distinct Ukrainian variant, different from that of the Russian language in Russia. Beyond this, his use of the phrases "use it to our own advantage" and "two languages are better than one" demonstrates that Respondent 4 considers bilingualism to be of benefit, and views multiple language knowledge to be linguistic capital and a strategic advantage.

In the pro-Russian cohort, the interview data indicated that even though participants began using Ukrainian less "out of principle" after the beginning of the 2014 conflict, they are not opposed to English, despite blaming NATO for the Euromaidan Revolution and supposed intrusion in Ukraine's internal affairs. As English represents one of the world's "strong" languages, participants of this ideology have a positive attitude to it and invest time and energy into studying it. It is Ukrainian that they dismiss as unnecessary, both for personal benefit and national distinctiveness, identifying themselves with their Russian-speaking region and with the wider pan-Slavic territories for which the Russian language is a bond. They do not perceive the Ukrainian language as a link to the European identity, but as a representation of the

local underdeveloped rural community and an impoverished Ukraine with a bleak future.

> Respondent 5*:* I don't need Ukrainian at all, I need it only for government institutions, but I never use it there out of principle. I used to react to it calmly, but not anymore, with the political situation we have now. English—yes. When I went to the Football [World Cup], I was speaking English with fans from different countries . . . . Judging by the new education law, my daughter's school might switch to the Ukrainian language of instruction, and my attitude to it is radically negative. After this, it's not worth going to school at all, the only subjects worth studying are math (where languages don't matter), English and "foreign language," as they call Russian now (47 years old, male, IT specialist, interview in Russian).

Respondent 5's negative, largely dismissive view of the Ukrainian language was not the only perspective held by participants in the pro-Russian group, however. With the course of time and a partial disillusionment with Russian actions in the Donbas, another trend has emerged—that of gradually increasing tolerance toward the Ukrainian language. Respondent 6 indicates that the group has started to see the Ukrainian language to be an asset for their children, because it gives them more mobility inside Ukraine and widens their linguistic repertoire.

> Respondent 6: My attitude to Ukrainian has changed for the better, although it is forced on us and there is Russophobia . . . . But when I see my son likes it (his kindergarten uses Ukrainian) and he will need it. I'm glad he doesn't feel any difference [between Russian and Ukrainian] (44 years old, female, data scientist/scholar, interview in Russian).

In summary, the interview excerpts demonstrate how discourses of pride divide the participants of opposing ideological positions, compelling them to avoid Russian or Ukrainian languages. Nevertheless, discourses of profit motivate participants to become multilingual.

6. Conclusion

The findings of this study reveal that changes in the language attitudes of Russian-speaking Kharkivites in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have brought about shifts in their linguistic behaviour. Such shifts depend on three factors: first, how they position themselves politically; second, how they interpret the role of language in a nation; and third, whether they see any benefit in speaking different languages.

Participants in the pro-Ukrainian group, which considers the Ukrainian language to be important for state consolidation, expressed a tendency to

increase its use, especially in formal contexts such as in government institutions, at work, and with people in the service industry. However, their speaking competence lags behind their reading and writing skills because of the immediacy of spoken language. Due to their support for Ukraine's European integration, participants of this study who embraced a Ukrainophile ideology expressed great interest in mastering foreign languages, especially English, but also German and Polish. This may be due to the fact that English brings them politically and culturally closer to the Western world and opens up wider career and mobility opportunities, to which the locally-used Ukrainian language may not give them access. Although this group viewed the Russian language negatively, most of the participants indicated that they would still prefer that their children continue to learn it and speak it. In other words, it should remain in their linguistic repertoire and function as a tactical advantage, allowing them to communicate in the language of the adversary.

Participants in the centrist pro-Ukrainian group, which embraces the idea that language does not matter for state-building, expressed positive attitudes toward both Russian and Ukrainian, preferring Russian for use in everyday communication, but arguing that monolingualism is "archaic" based on examples of successful multilingual European countries. Despite tending to use Russian as the language of choice across a variety of contexts, these participants expressed a strong interest in Ukrainian and foreign languages, and considered bilingualism and multilingualism to be assets. One of the participants suggested that legitimizing his variety of Russian would allow him to distance himself from Russia while continuing to use his first language. These participants also demonstrated efforts to accommodate bilingualism in everyday life by responding to Ukrainian speakers in Ukrainian, which indicates their willingness to use the language more often in Ukrainophone contexts.

Participants in the pro-Russian group reported using only Russian whenever possible and resorting to Ukrainian only when "forced to" (e.g., in official documentation), despite understanding the Ukrainian language well and being able to speak it and write in it. Their refusal to use Ukrainian can be explained by their reluctance to identify themselves with the new pro-Western Ukraine, and with their lack of motivation to speak the state language of a country that has a political orientation with which they disagree. Gradual disappointment with the Russian actions in the Donbas, however, seems to have changed their opinions of Ukraine and its language for the better, enabling them to recognize the benefits of mastering the Ukrainian language for mobility inside the country. Furthermore, despite blaming NATO for organizing the Euromaidan Revolution, the pro-Russian cohort has not turned away from English and EU languages, seeing them as

"linguistic capital" that can open doors to wider labour markets and social opportunities.

Although the participants' opposing political views and their different discourses of pride condition them to be either willing or reluctant to use Ukrainian or Russian in certain contexts, their desire for greater linguistic capital unite them. These discourses of profit act as a counterbalance, urging them to hedge their bets on the linguistic market by being multilingual.

The Russian-speaking Kharkivites are being pulled in one direction by local forces represented by participants' identification with Ukraine and their Russophone region, and in another direction by global forces embodied by Europe and the Western world and by Russia and the post-Soviet countries. Linguistically, these forces are manifest in the pro-Ukrainian community's pride in being competent in Ukrainian and in the desire of all of the participants to communicate with the Western world in English or EU languages, and with the post-Soviet space in Russian, both of which offer mobility given the insecure position in which Kharkiv finds itself.

Works Cited

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. ©1983, Verso, 2006.

Arel, Dominique. “La Face cachée de la Révolution orange: l'Ukraine et le déni de son problème régional.” *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2006, pp. 11-48. http://www.persee.fr/doc/receo_0338-0599_2006_num_37_4_1788. Accessed 14 Feb. 2020.

---. “Recensement et légitimation nationale en Russie et dans la zone postsoviétique.” *Critique internationale,* vol. 4, no 45, 2009, pp. 19-36. DOI: 10.3917/crii.045.0019.

“Arkhiv. Chysel'nist' naselennia.” *Golovne upravlinnia statystyky u Kharkivs'kii oblasti*, 2019, kh.ukrstat.gov.ua/chyselnist-naselennia-shchomisiachna-informatsiia. Accessed 28 June 2019.

Bilaniuk, Laada. *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine*. Cornell UP, 2005.

---. “Ideologies of Language in Wartime.” *Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of Change*, edited by Olga Bertelsen, Ibidem Press, 2016, pp. 139-60.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Ce que parler veut dire.* Fayard, 1982.

Edwards, John. *Language, Society and Identity.* Basil Blackwell, 1985.

“European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.” *Council of Europe*, 5 Nov. 1992, www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680695175. Accessed 28 June 2019.

“European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” *European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe,* 2 Oct. 2013, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2019.

Fishman, Joshua A. “Who Speaks What Language to Whom and When?” *La Linguistique*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1965, pp. 67-88.

Fouse, Gerry, C. *The Languages of the Former Soviet Republics: Their History and Development.* University Press of America, 2000.

“Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report.” *Council of Europe*, Feb. 1995, https://rm.coe.int/16800c10cf. Accessed 28 June 2019.

Grosjean, François. “Studying Bilinguals: Methodological and Conceptual Issues.” *The Handbook of Bilingualism,* edited by Tej K. Bhatia and William C. Ritchie, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 32-63.

Heller, Monica. “Bilingualism As Ideology and Practice.” *Bilingualism: A Social Approach,* edited by Monica Heller, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 1-22.

---. *Paths to Post-Nationalism: A Critical Ethnography of Language and Identity*. Oxford UP, 2011.

Heller, Monica, and Alexandre Duchêne. “Pride and Profit: Changing Discourses of Language, Capital and Nation-State.” *Language in Late Capitalism: Pride and Profit,* edited by Alexandre Duchêne and Monica Heller, Routledge, 2012, pp. 1-21.

Hjerm, Mikael. “National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries.” *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 41, no. 4, 1998, pp. 335-47.

Jodelet, Denise. “Les Représentations sociales: Un domaine en expansion.” *Les Représentations sociales,* edited by Denise Jodelet, Presses universitaires de France, 1989, pp. 47-78.
Kulyk, Volodymyr. “Language and Identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan.” *Thesis Eleven,* vol. 136, no. 1, 2016, pp. 90-106. DOI: 10.1177/0725513616668621.
---. “Soviet Nationalities Policies and the Discrepancy between Ethnocultural Identification and Language Practice in Ukraine.” *Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe,* edited by Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin, Cambridge UP, 2014, pp. 202-21. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107286191.010.
---. “What Is Russian in Ukraine? Popular Beliefs Regarding the Social Roles of the Language.” *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*, edited by Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, Edinburgh UP, 2014, pp. 117-43.
Laitin, David D. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Cornell UP, 1998.
Maiboroda, Oleksandr M., and Mai I. Panchuk. “Movne ta polityko-politychne protystoiannia v Ukraini: prychyny, chynnyky, proiavy.” *Movna sytuatsiia v Ukraini mizh konfliktom ta konsensusom*, Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen' imeni I. F. Kurasa, 2008, pp. 205-34.
Martin, Terry D. *An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938*. 1996. The University of Chicago, PhD dissertation*.*
Moscovici, Serge. *Social Representations: Explorations in Social Psychology.* New York UP, 2001.
Pauly, Matthew D. *Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923-1934*. Toronto UP, 2014.
Pavlenko, Aneta. “Language Rights versus Speakers’ Rights: On the Applicability of Western Language Rights Approaches in Eastern European Contexts.” *Language Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2011, pp. 37-58.
“Pro zasady derzhavnoi movnoi polityky.” *Zakonodavstvo Ukrainy*, 2018. zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17. Accessed 28 June 2019.
“Putin poprosil u Sovfeda razresheniia vvesti voiska na Ukrainu.” *RBK*, 1 March 2014, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/03/2014/570418849a794761c0ce7494. Accessed 14 Feb. 2020.
Riabchuk, Mykola. “Playing with Ambiguities: Ukraine’s Language Law.” *Open Democracy*, 28 June 2012, www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/playing-with-ambiguities-ukraines-language-law/. Accessed 29 June 2019.
Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity.* Penguin Books, 1991.
Søvik, Margrethe B. “Language Practices and the Language Situation in Kharkiv: Examining the Concept of Legitimate Language in Relation to Identification and Utility.” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, vol. 201, 2010, pp. 5-28. DOI: 10.1515/ijsl.2010.002
---. *Support, Resistance and Pragmatism: An Examination of Motivation in Language Policy in Kharkiv, Ukraine*. Stockholm University, 2007.
Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour.” *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by Stephen Worshel and William G. Austin, Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986, pp. 7-24.

Trainor, Audrey A. "Interview Research." *Reviewing Qualitative Research in the Social Sciences*, edited by Audrey A. Trainor and Elizabeth Graue, Routledge, 2013, pp. 125-36.

"Vseukrains'kyi perepys naselennia '2001': Movnyi sklad naselennia." *Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy*, 2003-04, http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_uk.asp. Accessed 27 June 2019.

Woolard, Kathryn A. "Language Ideology As a Field of Inquiry." *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, edited by Bambi B. Schieffelin, et al., Oxford UP, 1998, pp. 3-47.